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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the dilemma of choosing talent using NBA data from 
1987 to 2003. We find there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. 
If superstars are found, they are usually identified early. However, more 
false positives exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. Our results 
suggest the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a winner’s curse 
but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose, but, if you 
are going to win, you must buy a ticket. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economics has a long history of situations where 
agents have ex post regrets from decisions made 
under uncertainty. In the now classic case of the 
winner’s curse, agents who have differing beliefs 
about an amenity value will find, in an auction, the 
winner of the auction will be the bidder who 
overvalued that amenity. Capen et al. (1971) and 
Pepall and Richards (2001) suggest a winner’s curse 
emerges in competitive bidding environments; 
Cassing and Douglas (1980) provide an example 
of the winner’s curse in baseball free agency. 
More recently, Lazear (2004) identifies the Peter 
Principle as a situation where individuals who are 
promoted may have been lucky in a stochastic sense 
and been promoted above their performance level. 
 
Nowhere is the problem more pronounced than in 
the pursuit of superstar talent. Rosen (1981) outlined 
the theoretical constructs of the market for superstars 
and recognized the pervasiveness of the search. Sports 
teams are in pursuit of the next Michael Jordan, 
movie studios pursue the next Titanic and music 
producers seek the next Beatles. Yet player after 
player, movie after movie and singer after singer fail 
to meet expectations. In the pursuit of superstars, 
there are many false positives. We identify this 
problem as the dilemma of choosing talent. 
 
In Section I, we model the dilemma of choosing 
talent when the distribution of talent is known to be 
from the upper portion of a talent distribution. In 
Section II, we test the theory using a panel study of 
players in the NBA from 1987 to 2003. We conclude 
with a discussion of the dilemma of choosing talent 
and how it relates to the economics of superstars. 
 
  
Sports in general provide a virtual laboratory to 
test implications of labour markets theories (Kahn, 
2000). For instance, Burdekin and Idson (1991) test 
customer discrimination using NBA fan data, while 
Stone and Warren (1999) use NBA player cards to 
test for customer discrimination. Hamilton (1997) 
and Gius and Johnson (1998) test for wage discrimination 
in the NBA; Jones et al. (1999) perform similar 
analysis for the NHL. Eshker et al. (2004) use NBA 
data to study the winner’s curse in hiring international 
basketball players. Other studies have analysed 
the draft mechanism in choosing talent. Hendricks 
et al. (2003) analyse uncertainty, option value and 
statistical discrimination in the NFL draft. Groothuis 
et al. (2007) analyse early entry in the NBA draft, 
while Lavoie (2003) focuses on discrimination in the 
NHL draft. Our study, following the same structure, 
provides insights into the NBA as well as to the 
labour market in general. 
 
  
II. THE MODEL 
 
To formally model the problem of choosing talent, 
consider what happens to the probability of finding 
high quality talent when the lower bound for high 
quality increases. Assume: 
 
 
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To empirically test the model of the dilemma of 
choosing talent, we focus on NBA data for performance 
from the 1987–1988 season to the 2003–2004 
season. We use a measure of player performance 
called the efficiency formula to develop a distribution 
of talent. As reported by NBA.com, this index is 
calculated per game as: (pointsþreboundsþassistsþ 
stealsþblocks) – [(field goals attempted – field goals 
made)þ(free throws attempted _ free throws 
made)þturnovers)]. This formula provides a measure 
of quality that is based upon performance in all 
aspects of the game. In Table 1, we report the mean, 
median, SD and highest level of the efficiency rating. 
We find in all cases the mean is higher than the 
median, suggesting a right-skewed distribution of 
talent. We also find that the highest value is always 
over 3 SDs from the mean. In Fig. 1, we plot a 
distribution of efficiency ratios for the 2001–2002 
season. The distribution is skewed right with only a 
few players in the top tail of the distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2, we focus on players whose efficiency 
rating is 2 SDs from the mean. We find from 12 to 22 
players a season have efficiency ratings over 2 SDs 
from the mean. During this time period, we find only 
two players, who were in this elite category, 
undrafted, Ben Wallace in 2001–2002 season and 
Brad Miller in the 2003–2004 season. Many were on 
the list a multiple of times, some as many as 9 years. 
During this time, we find many of the number 
one picks and lottery picks are in the elite category. 
Some number one picks, however, never show up on 
the list. Still others only make the list one time in their 
career. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 3, we look at only the top five players in 
efficiency ratings. We find, in our 17-year panel, only 
19 players fill the 85 spots in this time period. Most 
were on the list a multiple of times. The lowest rank 
in the draft on this list was the 13th pick – two 
players, Karl Malone in 1985 and Kobe Bryant in 
1996. Many of the top players were number one draft 
picks. Many number one picks, however, did not 
make the top five players in the NBA. In fact, many 
of the top picks did not make it to two deviations 
above the mean. There are many false positives. 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 4 the mean, SD, minimum value, 
maximum value and number of observations for 
efficiency are reported by draft number. 
The figures in this table reveal some interesting 
results. First, the drop-off in efficiency between the 
first pick in the draft and the second pick is 
statistically significant.1 The decrease in mean efficiency 
is also statistically significant between the fifth 
and sixth picks. There is a general negative relationship 
between mean efficiency and draft number; 
exceptions to this trend occur when lower picked 
players overachieve (e.g. both Karl Malone and Kobe 
Bryant were thirteenth picks in the draft). Overall, the 
draft appears to represent either an efficient judge of 
talent or a self-fulfilling prophesy (teams may give 
number one picks more minutes and more opportunities 
to be a superstar). Hoang and Staw (1995) 
support the latter view; they find teams grant more 
playing time to their most highly drafted players even 
after controlling for performance, position and 
injury. 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 5, we summarize the dilemma of choosing 
talent by calculating the percentage of players who 
obtain superstar status by draft number. Column one 
calculates the percentage of players who have at least 
one season of performance 2 SDs above the mean. 
We find that 80% of number one draft picks have at 
least one superstar season where their performance is 
2 SDs above the mean. This percentage falls off 
quickly with only 40% of number two draft picks and 
30% of number three draft picks having a superstar 
season. Column two reports the percentage of players 
by draft pick who make the top five players in the 
league. Here we find the dilemma of choosing talent is 
great; only 35% of number one draft picks perform at 
this level, and this falls off even more quickly. 
Finding superstars is a rare event indeed. 
 
To further test the dilemma of choosing talent, we 
use a random effects panel model to estimate player’s 
efficiency ratings. A simple equation to represent the 
model is: 
 
 
 
where i refers to the individual player, Effii represents 
the efficiency of the player in year t, X1 is a vector of 
time-invariant player characteristics, X2(t-1) is a 
vector of experience measures and "t is vector of 
disturbances. The only time-variant player characteristics 
included in the model are experience and 
experience squared; no performance statistics are 
used since efficiency is computed from these statistics. 
Time-invariant personal characteristics used to 
explain efficiency are player height (measured in 
inches), years of college and a dummy variable equal 
to one for white players. 
Two options for estimating this model are the fixed 
effects approach and the random effects approach. In 
the fixed effects formulation of the model, differences 
across individuals are captured in differences in the 
constant term; thus any time-invariant personal 
characteristics are dropped from the regression. In 
this formulation of the model, it is impossible to 
determine if differences exist between players in terms 
of efficiency due to draft number or other timeinvariant 
variables. Therefore the fixed effects model 
will not be used. 
 
In the random effects formulation, the differences 
between individuals are modelled as parametric shifts 
of the regression function. This technique of estimating 
panel data allows for estimates of all of the time-invariant 
personal characteristics as well as the 
experience statistics. Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
developed a Lagrange multiplier test (LM-test) for 
the appropriateness of the random effects model 
compared to the OLS format.2 The LM-test 
statistic is 9109.99, which greatly exceeds the 95% 
Chi-squared with one degree of freedom, 3.84. Thus 
the simple OLS regression model with a single 
constant term is inappropriate. 
 
 
 
 
In Table 6, we report the results of the random 
effects model run using data from the 1987–1988 
through 2002–2003 seasons.3 In Regression I, draft 
number, experience, experience squared, years of 
college and race are all statistically significant 
determinants of efficiency; height is not. As expected, 
efficiency declines as draft number rises. Efficiency 
initially rises with experience then declines. Efficiency 
declines as years of college rise; this reflects the early 
entry of outstanding college or high school players. 
Regression II is run minus the draft number variable. 
The coefficient of height is now positive and 
significant. Obviously there is collinearity between 
draft number and height. 
The negative coefficient for white players is 
interesting. A priori we would expect this coefficient 
to equal zero. The results suggest that white players 
may be drafted higher than their future performance 
would indicate. Lavoie (2003) has studied the NHL 
draft and concluded there is entry discrimination 
against French Canadian hockey players. Exit 
discrimination in the NBA has been the focus of 
recent articles by Hoang and Rascher (1999) and 
Groothuis and Hill (2004). Perhaps future research 
on entry discrimination is warranted. 
 
The R-squared of the models is around 16–17% 
overall. It is somewhat higher in explaining variation 
in efficiency between players, approximately 21%, 
and between years for the same players, 26%. In 
general, the results suggest a great deal of unexplained 
variation in player efficiency from season to 
season. The weakness of the explanatory power of the 
model may be somewhat surprising given the plethora 
of data available to NBA executives prior to making 
draft decisions. In addition to college and/or high 
school performance statistics available for all players 
in the draft, the NBA holds camps in which the top 
players play against one another. Obviously there are 
characteristics and attributes that are not easily seen 
or measured that affect player performance. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The dilemma of choosing talent suggests, when 
employers seek to find the very best of a pool of 
applicants, more false positive signals exist than 
correct decisions. Using NBA data, we find there is 
much uncertainty in selecting talent. However, stars 
and superstars are generally correctly identified in the 
draft. Our results suggest the dilemma of choosing 
talent is not so much a winner’s curse, but more like a 
purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose, but, 
if you are going to win, you must buy a ticket. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The value of the test statistic is 6.5239. This is greater than the critical value at the.005 level 
of significance given the degrees of freedom. 
 
2. See Stata Release 6, Reference SU-Z pp. 438–9 for details or Greene (1990), pp. 572–3. 
 
3. The last season used in this regression analysis, 2002–03 season was selected to avoid any 
selectivity bias that might have occurred from too many young high school players jumping into 
the league prior to the imposition of the 19-year-old rule and individual salary cap negotiated 
into the latest NBA agreement. 
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